The concept of the general will was first introduced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the eighteenth century. He ultimately attributed four basic characteristics to the general will, claiming it was inalienable, infallible, indivisible, and absolute. But what exactly was this general will and how are we to interpret it?
The question of defining the general will becomes more pronounced when Rousseau discusses this idea of majority voting in a civil society. Rousseau essentially presents two interpretations of what the general will consists of. In the first case, Rousseau identifies the general will with the preference of the majority. This comes from his claim that general would require some proposal if it consisted in the fact that the majority of people showed a preference for that proposal. In the second case, Rousseau identifies the general will with the common interest if the society. Rousseau claims that the general would require some proposal if it consisted on the fact that the proposal was in the common interest of the people.
At first glance these interpretations seem to both be plausible explanations of the nature of the general will. However, further analysis of these interpretations under certain considerations pertaining to democratically determining the general will reveal certain inconsistencies.
Rousseau first presents a consideration of the general will where the first interpretation that identifies the general will with the majority preference appears implausible. First we explore the first consideration. In a theoretical voting scheme, individuals would vote on a given proposal based on whether or not the proposal would be in agreement with what the individual deems the general will. In this scheme, the general will is determined by counting votes and in effect, would reflect the majority preference. Here, the genera will reflects the will of the majority, based on the individuals perceived will of the majority. What then do we make of a situation where the individual finds himself in the minority opinion? This would indicate the individual was incorrect about what he believed the was the will of the majority, or the general will. Therefore, the individual would accept the majority preference since that would be deemed the general will and abandon what he believed to be the general will. This scheme is implausible.
In this first consideration, individual A votes on a proposal by considering what the he believes to be the general will requires. Individual B votes on the proposal using the same consideration, as does Individual C. In essence, individuals A, B, and C vote on the proposal by considering what the other will decide the general will requires. The majority of votes therefore reflects what the majority of individuals believed the majority preference would be. Therefore, the majority of individual preferences cannot be the general will itself. The general will cannot simply be a collection of individual preferences or the procedure of coming to a determination on the basis of individual preferences. The general will must be more this.
Rousseau presents a solution to this conflict. According to Rousseau, in order to avoid this problem, all members who enter into the social contract should commit to obeying laws and regulations that are consistent with the common interest of all those in contract. The general will can therefore be identified with the common interest of all the people. This avoids the problem of the previously proposed scheme because this would be more effective at determining what the general will actually required without the internal inconsistencies of voting based on the perceived voting of other.
This also presents a problem. Rousseau claims earlier that the in the event that an individual found himself in the minority opinion, there would be a fundamental breach of personal liberties if it were necessary to completely abandon ones opinion simply because the majority voted in a different direction. This would indicate that the general will could not just identified with the common interest. Being in the minority opinion does not in and of itself deem an individual to be wrong, although it may give reason to reconsider ones original opinion. If the common interest was the only consideration, Rousseau explains that you would simply conclude you were incorrect about what the general will required if you found yourself in the minority opinion.
When we look back at these two considerations, we see that the two interpretations of seem to situationally inconsistent. When we adopt the interpretation that identifies the general will with majority preference singularly, the interpretation proves implausible. When we adopt the interpretation that identifies the general will with the common interest singularly, this interpretation also proves to be seemingly implausible. What can we take from this result? Rousseau proposes a definition of the general will that does not take the two interpretations singularly but rather combines elements of both into a new, more comprehensive identification of the general will.
The comprehensive definition of the general will therefore identifies the general will with both elements of majority preference and considerations of common interest. We therefore propose a definition of general will that identifies it as a procedure for making joint or collective decisions, based on considerations of the common interest. In addition, the general will regulates the actions of all the people bound in the social contract. This characterization of the general will establishes a systematic democratic society that takes on proceduralist, results-oriented, and preference-oriented elements. The individuals who enter into the social contract agree to be in accordance with the general will, and by extension agree to be in accordance with the determinations identified through this procedure.
This proposed definition of the general will seems to settle the dilemma of the inconsistencies we observed in the two original interpretations. However, it would be prudent to also consider the nature of this voting that would be consistent with the proposed definition of the general will. Individuals must commit to obeying decisions made by the proposed voting procedure. However, what would constitute a vote that would require one to obey the decision that was reached? Rousseau makes the claim that unanimous decisions are instances where the decision of a vote should be obeyed. In the event that everyone agrees unanimously on a proposal, there would be no conflict and there would be no question as to what the general will is that should be obeyed. This is however often not the case. Often the members of a group will disagree on a proposed matter, and the common interest may not be clearly apparent.
In cases where unanimity is not attained, Rousseau claims it would be fair to say the best possible mechanism for establishing a decision making procedure would be by considering majority voting. Majority voting itself could be further characterized based on the nature of the item being voted on. In general, Rousseau agrees that the majority rule can be established as either a simple majority, meaning fifty-percent plus one, or a more substantial majority number that would have to be deemed significant enough. The simple majority rule can apply to items of business that are more time sensitive than other situations, such as voting on items of serious law that would probably benefit from more careful consideration. Basically, once there is an agreement to obey the procedure of democratic voting and the decisions that result from the procedure, the definitions of majority rule can be determined based on the nature of the vote and the urgency of action deemed necessary.
Thus, the claims Rousseau makes regarding majority voting are not consistent with any one of the interpretations discussed above if the interpretations are taken singularly. However, Rousseau settles this dilemma by proposing a third, more comprehensive interpretation of the general will that combines elements of both interpretations. The general will does identify with the majority preference, but cannot only be defined by majority preference. The general will does identify with the common interest of the people but the common interest alone would present an incomplete criteria for determining the general will. Rousseau’s general will is comprehensive and multi-oriented, consistent with the different interpretations.
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