The Five Tenets of Conservatism

What is the conservative right? Counter to political liberalism, conservatism is traditionalism; upholding traditional values and principles; cautious in prompting change yet willing to apply necessary modifications; restraining from needlessly progressing away from a stable standard. That is conservatism in its broadest sense. Conservatism in principally defined by five predominant elements: epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, economics, and personal agency. 

In terms of epistemology, religion takes precedence. Religion is a very real aspect of conservatism, though in no is there anything resembling a spiritual state. God is recognized, respected, and honored in conservative society. Fundamentally, it is understood that God is the creator of the universe and the cohesiveness of all being. He created man and directly provided man with the capacity to reason. Thus, human knowledge and understanding was granted to man by God, and so it can be discerned that man’s inalienable rights are also granted by God. God gave man reason, God gave man innate rights. This is the general conservative perspective.

Conservative metaphysics is very important and opens up one of the most fundamental elements to the conservative philosophical system. Conservative metaphysics is the acknowledgement of an objective reality. Objectivity is essential to the conservative understanding of society. And objective view of reality infers that one recognizes the existence of a universally adaptive truth, a genuine and knowable truth; the existence of a basic good and a basic bad. Subjectivity exculpates the individual; it transfers personal responsibility away from the person. What an objective reality inherently means is that an individual’s actions are held against a basic standard, and an individual is personally accountable for his own decisions. This is the fundamental element of conservatism which will be echoed in many other aspects of conservative philosophy. 

The ethics of conservatism expressly focuses on self-interest. An individual is an equal entity within greater society. That individual should always pursue the course of action benefiting self best. Essentially, benefiting self is incrementally benefiting the society at large; as a unit if society progresses and becomes better well off, so does the whole of society. This to no extent promotes selfish behavior. Taking care of self with thoroughly good intentions does not stand comparable to greedy selfishness. Intention determines the effect of an individual’s decisions and positive self-sufficiency is detrimental to no person yet it benefits all involved parties. As each member of society takes care of themselves, the net effect culminates in a healthier social setting with less structural divisions and tensions.

Economic conservatism is one of the most politically debated areas of contention. This closely ties into the ethical argument. In any free market economy existing in a healthy, competitive environment, equal opportunity exists. When analyzing the basic principle of economic competition, it can be understood that there will inevitably be winners and losers in the market. Wealth undoubtedly accumulates on only one side. This is not an unfair or imbalanced consequence. As previously stated, opportunity exists equally though the results cannot plausibly guaranteed equal. An individual in a healthy capitalistic economy should earn his share of economic well-being and nothing more or less than his work earns him. This is the reality of work and pay in the practical world. Conservatism emphasizes self-accountability, in this case, economic self-accountability. 

The final aspect of conservatism, which has been encompassed in many of the other elements, is personal agency. This is the recognition of freewill and the rejection of determinism. Determinism is the byproduct of mid-twentieth century Freudian psychology. Freud established three basic categories of determinism: genetic determinism, psychic determinism, and environmental determinism. Genetic determinism assumes that much of what we do and think is predetermined by our genetic identity. This essentially passes on responsibility to past ancestry. Psychic determinism states that ones upbringing determines many of our decisions to do certain things. Here, nurture is to blame for ones problems. Finally, environmental determinism explains how ones external environment and atmosphere strongly determine aspects of ones life. Conservatism completely rejects all aspects of the theory of determinism. Self-accountability is again the recurring theme; the freewill of an individual is emphasized and determinism is not thought to determine anything. To elaborate, determinism does not thoroughly determine any aspect of anyone’s life. It is true however, that external elements may influence, but to no extent do they absolutely determine our lives. Self is supreme over all other elements and in its most basic level, the stimulus-response paradigm points to self as the effector of any consequent decisions. An individual decides the response to any given stimulus and each individual possesses the innate capacity to reason intelligently. There is no pragmatic reason to pass on responsibility or blame an external device; self-accountability remains key. 

Conservatism values what is present and what is possible. It values traditions and principals. It is optimistic about the human individual. It recognizes differences present within society today while at the same time emphasizing the relative equality of opportunity. Secularity is not recognized because a spiritual social aspect is an innate characteristic of an individual and his life. Ones situation in life is a direct product of ones personal decision making. Thus, the most important element, which is encompassed in some regard in all five tenets, is self-accountability. This is conservatism, the philosophical system of conservatism. 

A Comparison of Hobbesian & Lockean Natural Right Theories

A natural right is the concept of fundamental liberties inherent in the nature of universal beings that exist above the framework laws or civil institutions. In essence, natural rights are those that exist regardless of its enforcement by a governing body. 

Both John Locke and Thomas Hobbes put forth relevant theories on the social contract of men and the laws of nature; however the semblance ends there. Though the theories are similarly based to some respect, the analysis of the nature or existence of such inherent rights is distinctly different between the two theorists.  The most notable difference which carries into the differences in higher theory is Hobbes’s belief that man is not a social being and that the institution of society is exactly that, an institution that would cease to exist without the power of state influence to maintain it. This fundamental principle establishes the base on which Hobbes would postulate that in exchange for his own life, man concedes any and all rights he may possess to the state which is markedly different than Locke’s notion that man inherently possesses certain inalienable liberties; liberties that the state exists to protect. The disparity between the two theories can be better understood when we reexamine the basic tenets each holds with respect to jus naturale and the natural state of man.

First consider the Hobbesian view of human nature. According to Hobbes, man does not exist as a social animal. The existence of a society is strictly contingent on the power of an established state. Rather, man exists simply as physical objects whose actions can be qualified as complex and mechanistic. Man does develop certain desires and impulses which he has the right to act on, and this he is motivated to satisfy his personal desires. The whole of human actions and decisions are fully based on this motivation to satiate personal desires. Human beings are therefore free to act however one deems fit pursuant to his personal inclinations. Thus the fundamental right of man according to Hobbes derives itself from man’s pursuit of self preservation which he refers to as “a necessity of nature.” Man has the right to follow this fundamental nature to satisfy self desires. 

No society exists in this natural state of man. On the contrary, all men exist individually, seeking individual satisfaction and motivated strictly based on self preservation. This ultimately results in man’s natural state of existence to be defined as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Furthermore, man does not possess the capacity to reason with his natural state or possess any constructive knowledge that would allow him to resolve disputes with other men. Since what is good and just is simply whatever each individually deems as satisfactory to his own desires, the knowledge of good and evil essentially does not exist and as a result, men in principle will come into conflict with one another, what Hobbes calls the “war of all against all.” The only possible form of peace can exist only when men concede their personal liberties to the authority of a common government whereby men develop Hobbes’s social contract, whereby you are loosely granted the right not to be killed. Civil society therefore is the willful application of force by the common government to establish mutual protection of the contract; an institution of the state and not a natural institution of man. To Hobbes, the state precedes civil society. 

Thus Hobbes states this about natural rights of men: men are only obligated to self preservation as it is a necessity of nature, and to deny ones nature is to deny ones existence as a human being. Men have no obligations by birth or nature, to anyone or anything aside from himself. This in principle grants all men unlimited rights and liberties. The important element here is the insistence that these rights are strictly non-obligatory and represent man’s complete liberty in the natural state. However, the conflict inherent in the natural state is that men will inevitably come into war against each other when all of their liberties are unbounded. This complete lack of limitations provides man with an undesirable social condition. As a result, man concedes many of his personal liberties and establishes a system of obligations in order to establish civil society. Hobbes refuses to derive natural rights from natural law, which according to Hobbes represents the complete opposite of liberty. In effect, Hobbesian rights come prior to law, whether that law exists naturally or institutionally. 

Let is now consider Locke’s derivation of natural right. Locke states that men are indeed social animals. For Locke, humans are motivated by reason, in addition to the emotions and desires that Hobbes put forth. Men are not only self-concerned but also altruistic in nature. This contrasts sharply with Hobbes, who denies the existence of a social sphere of human nature. Furthermore, since men are reasonable beings, they are capable of self rule and can be entrusted to act in accordance with the interests of others in addition to his personal motivations. Again, Hobbes would contend that humans are incapable of any form of self rule since we are desire-driven beings. Locke argues than men are capable of discerning right from wrong since they have the capacity to reason. This is not to say that Locke believes all people will behave in accordance with their reason, for man is certainly fallible. Thus, in the natural state, peace is attainable and individuals are fully capable of coexisting in peace and civility under the premise of self rule. Locke then explains that men bind themselves to a social agreement that states that each individual concedes to right to personally enact punishments and allows the social body to establish a system of maintaining just order. As a result, each individual is granted certain inalienable rights which include the right to life, liberty, and just protection of personal property. Again, Hobbes posits that the social contract simply guarantees the right not to be killed, and even that right is loosely granted since the sovereign is justified in all his actions. Thus, According to Locke, the civil society is not a product of the state and precedes the state. The legitimacy of the state is defined by the social order established by the individuals who enter into the social contract.  

For Locke, man is capable of far greater than simple, mechanistic action. Man possesses the special capacity to reason and govern one’s own desires and decisions. We see this clearly in paragraph 56 where he appeals to the biblical first man stating, “Adam was created a perfect man, his body and mind in full possession of their strength and reason, and so was capable from the first instant of his being to provide for his own support and preservation, and govern his actions according to the dictates of the law of reason which God had implanted in him.” Contrast this to the idea of a nasty and brutish human existence that can only lead to a bellum omnium contra omnes.  Locke disagrees strongly to Hobbes’s assertion that the state of nature must exist as a state of war. War is unreasonable and undesirable and therefore individuals would intentionally avoid belligerence on favor of negotiating more peaceful measures of coexistence. Hobbes would disagree that a peaceful coexistence is possible, due to the fact that he also makes this assertion based on the premise that man does not inherently possess the capacity to reason, especially with one another. 

When considering the differences between Hobbesian and Lockean theories on natural rights and liberties, it is also important to consider what each defines as a liberty. Hobbes argues that since human beings are completely desire-driven, personal liberty can be defined as the freedom from constraints that would in principle prevent one from satisfying their personal goals. Human purpose resides on the ability to fulfill whatever it is that man desires and any limitation or hindrance to that pursuit qualifies itself as a breach of personal liberty. Locke on the other hand would argue that our capacity to reason allow us to understand what it is we need to do in order to accomplish our goals and satisfy our desires. As a result, men will establish whatever rules and regulation they find fit in order for them to reach their desired goals. In essence, true personal liberty lies in the freedom to self-regulate. Regulations therefore serve not as a hindrance to freedom but rather a justifiable means to a common end. Thus, it is our reason that provides us the justification for self rule and allows us to practice what can be considered a more proactive approach to maintaining personal liberty. 

Hobbes was one of the first theorists to chart out the philosophical foundations of human nature and the rules and rights that we may or may not derive from our nature. He was one of the first to deviate from the traditional concept of personal obligation superseding personal rights. Although a Hobbesian state of human nature paints a more pessimistic picture on human capacity, it also maintains the importance of orderly state structure in avoiding the anarchical dilemma posed by man. Nevertheless, Locke justifies many of his claims in opposition to the Hobbesian ideal of the natural laws that govern human existence by incorporating the Enlightenment idea of man’s inherent capacity to reason. Locke also appeals to a spiritual element in his philosophy that Hobbes chose to exclude and develops what some would argue is a more optimistic picture on human nature and human capacity. Certainly much of Lockean theory regarding civil and political society can be seen to have heavily influenced many Western nations of today. 

The Natural State of Man in Hobbesian Philosophy

Thomas Hobbes once described man’s natural existence as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Certainly this is not an ideal that many aspire to when considering a natural state of existence but in the eyes of Hobbes, this is exactly how such a natural state of man could only be characterized. In his 1651 work The Leviathan, Hobbes details the foundations of developing ordered societies and legitimate and effective governing institutions, his culminating message being a warning about the bellum omnium contra omnes, or inevitable “war of all against all” if a system of order and government is not established. In order to substantiate the inevitable rise to war, Hobbes qualifies this natural anarchical dilemma by establishing a fundamental equality in the natural essence of man. 

The Hobbesian explanation of the natural condition of man is very intricate and complicated. Critics argue that  Hobbes presents an overly pessimistic frame of human nature and in fact the “natural state” that Hobbes often refers to does not seem to exist in reality, but merely in theory. Nevertheless, Hobbes contends that the essential element of man’s natural state is the lack of a governing body. Political establishments are artificial constructions of a functional society and would not exist in the natural state. Furthermore, in this ungoverned, natural state of existence, all men are essentially equal. This is an interesting notion since Hobbes agrees that certain individuals will undoubtedly be stronger in stature as well as those who would be stronger in mental acumen. However, Hobbes dismisses theses miniscule claims of inequality among men explaining, “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy (xiii.1).” The strongest in any group will eventually show weakness and the weak are very much capable of scheming to overtake an individual who may be considered of greater strength. Thus, in essence, everyman has the potential ability and capacity to take the life of any other man if he is in fact motivated to do so. This common capacity renders all members of society equal in ability, which leads to his next point: equality of hope. 

If indeed every man fundamentally possesses equal capacity as to his fellow man, then he is also conferred upon with equality of hope. Hobbes claims that in when all men have the equal ability and equal hope, men are bound to develop equal desires of the same things, things that can not be shared amongst everyone who desires it. Therefore from this equal hope comes a developing conflict of interests and desires. When men come into conflict with one another they become enemies to one another. And so men conflict with themselves because each loses trust in the true motives of the other, establishing diffidence among men. With men being enemies of other men and failing to develop a sufficient degree of trust among men, conflict and war erupts. Hobbes argues, “ from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation...so long till he see no power great enough to endanger him (xiii.4).” Furthermore, the movement towards conflict and war is morally justifiable because whether or not his assumptions about the designs put forth by other men are factually based, he is required to act in his own defense for the conservation of his own life and interests. 

A third element in man’s movement in the natural state towards conflict is the desire to establish himself among men as superior over this contenders. In the natural state men not only seek self preservation but when they successfully assert themselves among men, they seek recognition and value in the eyes of others. Essentially, man is proud and seeks glory among his fellow men. Men will further conflict in the pursuit of glory. Therefore, the three fundamental origins of conflict among men are competition, diffidence, and glory. All three serve as different justifications used when initiating into conflict with another, whether it be for gain, safety, or reputation as Hobbes states. 

The lack of any common power or security establishes that men will remain in a state of war. For as the principle causes alluded to, the essence of war was to protect and preserve oneself.  As long as there is no civil state of order and security in which men would reside, there cannot be an alternative to war in the natural state. Hobbes defines this period of war as not only the fighting of battles but also, “the tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known, ” and goes on to say at “All other time is Peace (xiii.8).” The result of such embittered conflict in pursuit of self-preservation is what Hobbes terms the incommodities of war where he famously describes “the life of man, solitary, poor, brutish, and short (xiii.9).” The interesting development in Hobbes’s argument is what comes next. Although this fighting seems destructive, which is certainly is, and the act of war seems chaotic, which it definitely would be, the actions of men in the natural state are simply manifestations of his inner passions and desires, which Hobbes contests is not a sin in and of itself, and neither is acting on these passions and desires until it breaks some law that proscribes it. Furthermore, these laws cannot exist without the agreement of all those who involved with respect to who establishes the law. 

This depiction of man’s natural state draws an anarchical, chaotic existence in which all men consist of being selfish, cowardly, and self-loving individuals with no sense of honesty or duty and seem to make no consideration to a framework of justice or law, which is what Hobbes is essentially getting at. First, in terms of his depiction of men’s characters, it can be said that there will undoubtedly be selfish or cowardly individuals; individuals led only by love for themselves. This does not decree everyman to this level of character. However, almost as a consequence of such selfish and cowardly people, men must act selfish and apprehensive in order to satisfy their own needs. This brings up one of Hobbes’s most interesting points about the natural state of man. 

According to Hobbes, men are justified, morally and ethically, to act in the spirit of self preservation. It is not that in this apparently anarchical system of existence that men are unable to establish a consist judgement of what is right and wrong, it is that when motivated by self-preservation, men will inevitably come into conflict with one another. In the natural state man is very much insecure and his reaction to conserve and protect whatever is defined to his own is according to Hobbes, a fundamental right of nature. It is not simply that individuals have the right to their own life, but that individuals have the right to determine how exactly to go about protecting their lives. The right of nature, or jus naturale, Therefore, in the natural state of man’s existence, no action can be considered an immoral or unjust act simply due to the variability in judgement among different persons. Hobbes claims that on an individual basis justice and injustice does not exist, “they are none of the faculties nether of the body, nor mind...They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude (xiii.13). For that reason, when men in civil society using both their passions and their reason, chose to seek peace, if for no other mean but self-preservation once again. If everyman waged war against every other man who he found fit as a threat, essentially this tactic proves to undermine the principle of self-preservation itself, since the most likely outcome of unabated warfare is death. 

Hobbes’s theory of the natural state of man is very different from those of other prominent philosophers such as John Locke or John Stuart Mills. The Hobbesian state of man has often been considered a pessimistic consideration of man’s innate character and interactive nature. Others contend that this natural state is merely theoretical and has never practically existed. Nevertheless, Hobbes formulates a very fascinating and valuable argument for the necessity of civil order in society and effective, legitimate government. Later in this same piece, Hobbes goes on to propose the Two Fundamental Laws of Nature by which men come into contract with one another in order to attain true self preservation through seeking peace. Through The Leviathan Hobbes essentially warns of the dangerous consequences of not establishing a legitimate governing body to maintain order and civility within a society that would otherwise consist of war motivated by self-preservation. War in the natural state is brought on through competition, diffidence, the pursuit of glory, all of which is only possible because of the equality of ability and hope that man maintains. Essentially, when all things become equal and the rule of law does not exist, bellum omnium contra omnes.

Ethical Discussions: The Topic of Euthanasia

On April 14, 1975 a twenty one year-old New Jersey teenager was rushed to Newton Memorial Hospital after collapsing at a party she was attending with friends that evening. She was admitted to Newton Memorial in a state of coma, unable to breathe for herself. After remaining in an unresponsive state for over nine days, she was transferred to a larger facility at Saint Clare’s Hospital in Denville, NJ. It was later learned that the girl had in fact consumed gin and tonics at the party after withholding food in order to lose weight for over two days. 

The person being referred to in this case is Karen Ann Quinlan, one of the first significant US case in the “right to die” debate. Quinlan had suffered irreversible brain damage as a result of extended respiratory failure of about 15-20 minutes. Doctors hypothesized that Quinlan had passed out from the alcohol on an empty stomach and consequentially aspirated on her own vomit. Quinlan’s eyes were observed to be disconjugate and her electroencephalography (EEG) showed abnormally slow wave activity. Medically, Quinlan displayed what has come be known as a persistent vegetative state, or PVS. 

As the Quinlan case goes, her condition only worsened with time as she became dependent on nasogastric feeding and a constant breathing ventilator. She continued to lose weight and remained in a highly unstable condition for months. In 1976, the Quinlan family decided not to keep Karen on life support since her condition seemed to be beyond recovery. The hospital refused to remove the feeding tube and the family took the case to the New Jersey Supreme Court. On March 31, 1976, the Court decided in favor of Quinlan and instructed the hospital to remove the ventilator. To everyones surprise, Karen Ann Quinlan remained alive with only the aid of artificial feeding for about nine more years until her eventual death of pneumonia on June 11, 1985. 

Karen Ann Quinlan’s case was groundbreaking and set the initial precedent for similar “right to die” cases. The Quinlan case continues to raise interesting debate in moral theology, bioethics, euthanasia, legal guardianship, and civil rights. Three tangible consequences of the Quinlan case was the institution of formal ethics committees in hospitals, the establishment of nursing homes and hospices, the establishment of health care proxies, and the development of advance heath directives. 

Though the case broadly encompasses many fields of thought and theory, the case remains the focal point for the death with dignity, “right to die” movement. Dying today has become a great deal more complicated than it had been a century ago. Rather than allowing natural death take its course, many medical and technological advances have allowed individuals to prolong their lives and stave off death for as long as possible. For many, this is a great thing because extending life is of great importance to them, but for other more terminally ill patients, staving off death may not be in their best interest. Matter of fact, the great debate lies in this incidental conflict of interest between the personal considerations of the patient and the medical and legal consideration of those providing the care. Court rulings have clearly affirmed a patient’s legal right to discontinue life-sustaining treatment at their choosing. In addition, there is extensive precedent for allowing family members to act as health care proxies on behalf of patients incapacitated beyond normal consciousness. However the unresolved section of debate remains whether a physician has the right to hasten a patients death if those are in fact the wishes expressed by or on behalf of the patient. This is of course referring to euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide. 

End of life issues such as these pose some fundamental questions. For instance, who decides whether life is worth living or not? Should people have the right to decide when and how they will die? Though many believe that dying would be preferable to suffering and enduring great pain while trapped in an a shell of a body, a significant number also argue that people do not have the capacity to decide when life starts or ends, either on the basis of moral theology or other philosophical basis, which will be discussed shortly. Furthermore, is euthanasia a merciful killing of terminally ill patients, or is it simply a euphemism for murder and a blatant violation of the Hippocratic oath? What are the moral dilemmas at hand here? What are the religious questions at hand? What are alternatives that can be considered? These questions establish the basis of the “right to die” debate. 

The physicians dilemma remains the conflict between preserving the life of the patient versus respecting the patients autonomy and dignity. In a legal brief released by the American Medical Association they state that:

"For over 2,000 years, the predominant responsibility of the physician has not been to preserve life at all costs but to serve the patient's needs while respecting the patient's autonomy and dignity,"

This stands in conflict with the provisions clearly outlined in the Hippocratic Oath that states:

"To please no one will I prescribe a deadly drug, or give advice which may cause his death." 

Many argue that the Hippocratic Oath could not have foreseen the technological advances of modern medicine while a great number of physicians adamantly oppose such notions, countering that the Hippocratic Oath outlines exactly what the physician is obligated to do and is not interpreted depending on contemporary circumstance. 

Before delving deeper into the philosophical arguments of euthanasia, it seems important to discuss the different classifications of euthanasia. Euthanasia can be carried out either with consent (voluntary euthanasia) or without explicit consent (involuntary euthanasia). Involuntary euthanasia is considered when the patient is incapacitated and cannot communicate their consent. This becomes very complicated as euthanasia by consent of proxy can establish multiple conflicts of interests. Euthanasia can also be classified as passive, non-aggressive, or aggressive. Passive euthanasia entails withholding basic treatment or administering pain medication with the knowledge that death may result. This is known as the principle of double effect. Non-aggressive euthanasia refers to the practice of removing life support by way of ventilator, feeding tube, or both. Finally, aggressive euthanasia entail administering lethal dosage of substance with the intention to kill the patient. The last two forms of euthanasia are most controversial and encompass most of the central debate.

Proponents of euthanasia most commonly argue personal choice, emphasizing that voluntary euthanasia is a fundamental principle of free choice in a liberal democracy. An individual has the right to life and that in principle implies a right to death. This implication is not understood by all as opponents deny such a right to death exists. Another prominent argument by proponents is the “quality of life” argument. The pain and suffering of the patient is incomprehensible to the external observer; it is in the best interest of the patient to end pain and suffering. Again, this argument is not accepted by opponents who contend that euthanasia is morally reprehensible; euthanasia in principle is simply a form of murder and the act of voluntary euthanasia is in essence a form of suicide, which is also scrutinized under moral pretenses. Furthermore, from a theological perspective quality of life cannot trump the sanctity of life. In Christianity, human life is a sacred entity belonging to God and humans have no authority to make decisions of choice to end ones life. Jewish Orthodox tradition shares a similar perspective, however accepts circumstantial situations where passive or non-aggressive euthanasia may be justifiable. 

Proponents do not simple rely on emotional swindling. There is the practical consideration of economy. There are many areas where medical care is spread thin and the physicians focus and energy should be used for people whose lives could be saved rather than waste money and human resources on patients who do not desire treatment and prefer to die. It is an actual economic burden to keep people alive past the point they can contribute to society. This brings up the issue of the role of the physician. Critics argue that voluntary euthanasia could unduly compromise the professional roles of medical practitioners and heath care providers. The physician swear the Hippocratic Oath which forbids euthanasia explicitly and posits that the role of the physician is to provide the best possible medical care in the best interest of preserving the life of the patient. Some argue whether the Oath actually means the best interest of the individual includes situations when the individual states a desire to die. The assertion that the physician has no role in assisting in the cessation of life leads many to believe no, however there is significant debate even within the medical community. As stated previously, the AMA has noted that the physician, while looking out for the best interest of the patient, must also respect the patients autonomy and dignity. 

Consider the perspective of the ethical egoist; my one and only basic obligation is to promote my own self interest. The patient therefore who wishes to die is ethically compelled to allow himself to die because that promotes his own self interest in dying. However ethical egoism is fundamentally flawed because there is conflict of interest rooted in the very principle of egoism. The physician may in fact feel that preserving the patients life is his or her primary obligation and there fore preventing the patients death would promote the physicians self interest. In this case, whose self interest takes precedence? Neither can take precedence over the other; the paradox of ethical egoism is that an ethical egoist cannot act as if he or she is an ethical egoist. The physician appears to be looking out for the patient self interest when actually he is motivated otherwise. The patient assumes to look out for the self interest of everyone involved including the family and the medical staff but in reality he is motivated by other self interests. As stated before, this essentially places multiple parties in conflict of interest.

Kant would suppose a different set of rules to be applied in this case. First, Kant asserts that human beings are endowed with reason and freedom of will, both of which would trump personal desires of happiness. He states that nature’s aim is not simply to extend happiness but rather to allow reason to lead them achieve their own happiness. Taken in the context of our current discussion, Kant would argue that simply to relieve human suffering and pain is not satisfactory enough to claim that euthanasia is ethically or morally justifiable. Moreover, the physician would have a genuine sense of duty to preserve the life of a patient rather than accommodate the death of a patient. For Kant, there is a fundamental difference between a personal desire and a personal sense of duty. A sense of duty is universal and can dictate what one ought to do in similar situations whereas desires are whimsical and transient. Therefore, ones desire to die as a result of pain, suffering, or a lack of motivation to continue living is not a decision that results from the rational nature of humans, but rather is a “spur of the moment,” non-rational decision. Kant argues that the moral value of an action is fundamentally based on the representation of law. In sum, Kant would declare that it would be against one’s own self-duty to commit suicide because suffering would outweigh pleasure if you lived. In addition, a physician has a genuine sense of duty to preserve ones life and acts as such in order to satisfy an end in itself, and not merely as a means to some ulterior motive. Therefore euthanasia cannot be justifiable under moral pretenses. 

Consider the utilitarian perspective. Utilitarianism states that an a morally right action is the action that will bring about the maximum happiness or preference-satisfaction on the whole for affected parties, or as more commonly stated, the greatest good for the greatest number of people. The foundation of this philosophical theory is the idea that the consequences of an action are determined by rule of pain and pleasure. The better the consequence in terms of maximizing happiness or satisfaction, the more ethical an alternative it is. To evaluate euthanasia in light of this philosophy, we must consider the five features of utilitarianism. (1) Consequentialism: we must consider the consequences of an action; euthanasia would result in  the patients desires being respected, the end of a pain-filled and suffering life, it would end the families agonizing over the weakened, undignified state of a loved one, it would allow the hospital and medical staff to move on to other more pressing cases, and it would take away the economic burden of keeping the patient alive on life-support. However, it would also question the fundamental role of the physician and establish a dangerous precedent. Though some argue that human dignity is not respected when a person lives off of life-support, it may also be argued that the practice of killing off people found to be suffering or feable-minded may easily diminish the essential value and dignity of life from a “greater society” perspective. The alternative is not performing the euthanasia, in which case the patient’s desires are not respected, the patient remains in pain, the family continues to agonize, and the health care providers must continue to allocate resources to the patient. However, the physicians role need not be questioned, the sanctity of life is preserved, and there is no harmful precedent being set. Since all the consequences of pain or pleasure are give equal value under this system, we consider the greatest net balance of happiness and preference-satisfaction over pain and dissatisfaction. One contend that euthanasia presents the greatest net benefit to the greatest number of people involved. 

However, there are several problems with this analysis. In the above analysis we assumed we were discussing voluntary euthanasia. In the case of involuntary euthanasia, this situation becomes more complicated and one could argue in favor of either direction. Furthermore, utilitarianism does not consider several important factors such as the transient nature of many human decisions and preferences and the limited nature of knowledge when accessing “happiness” of the different parties involved. Moreover, the objectification of pains and pleasures in addition to the normalizing of value systems may pose problems for people who consider certain consequences more relevant than others. Finally, it is usually very difficult to determine all of the potential consequences of an action or take into account all the possible alternatives. Utilitarian calculations can therefore argue either side of the “right to die” debate, although it does not present as strong an argument as does other theories. 

There are many viable arguments that can be posed for or against the practice of euthanasia, as the assessment thus far indicates. Nevertheless, I conclude this discussion by presenting my own perspective on the issue. In my reasoned opinion, I affirm my belief that euthanasia cannot be considered an ethically or morally sound practice on the basis of two fundamental reasons: (1) it undermines the dignity and integrity of the medical profession, and (2) it undermines the dignity and sanctity of human life. The first reason is important because as outlined in the Hippocratic Oath, the physicians ultimate role and obligation as a trusted practitioner of medicine is to respect and preserve the patients life. The patients autonomy does not trump this obligation if it in fact comes into conflict with the idea of preservation of life. Furthermore, a patients personal dignity is not respected or honored if the decision is to terminate the patient’s life. This leads into the second reason, which is the preservation of human dignity and the respect for the sanctity of life. When the common debate turns to a situation where one questions how dignity is being preserved when a person is kept on life support for years against their will or the will of the family, I counter by stating a person on life support is not a person with fulfilled life, in the sense that life support does not equate to true, independent human life. As a result, passive and non-aggressive euthanasia must be seen in a different light than aggressive euthanasia. 

Much of the current legislation on this issue assumes life support on par with a normal human life. An individual should be medically cared for to the maximum ability of the care provider, but when medicine cannot help the situation of the individual, the natural circumstances should be allowed to take its course. In the Quinlan case, the family did allow Karen to naturally pass, as there was nothing medically that could have been done to improve her situation. The fact that she survived for nearly a decade after removing life support may indicate that there is potential for future medical advancements in aiding PVS patients. In summary, a person cannot decide or chose a point of death, but moreover it is beyond the scope of a physician’s obligation to assist a patient in suicide. As I stated, euthanasia undermines the integrity of the medical profession and undermines the sanctity and dignity of life.

Works Consulted

Cohen-Almagor, Raphael. The Right to Die with Dignity: an Argument in Ethics, Medicine, and Law. New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers UP, 2001.

Dorkin, Ronald. Life's Dominion: an Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom. 1st ed. New York: Knopf, 1993.

"Right to Die." Public Agenda. Jan. 2008. Public Agenda Org. 4 Mar. 2008 <http:// www.publicagenda.org/issues/frontdoor.cfm?issue_type=right2die>.

United States. President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment : a Report on the Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions. Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O, 1983.

Marxian Principles of Human Flourishing in the Modern Age of Technology & Biomedicine

Introduction

Science and technology are at the forefront of our society today. Much that we do deals with progress, research, and development in the ever-growing technological sectors. However, the basic principles of ethics and morality shouldn’t change as a result of new technologies and the heart of modern debates in ethics and social morality lies on this precise idea. Modern advances in biotechnology and biomedicine, especially in the field of genetics, have opened the door to a mecca of new possibilities: the question remains whether the door opened a treasure chest of knowledge or a pandoras box. 

In the light of this controversy in social philosophy it is important to fully understand the basics of human interaction in order to make accurate judgements on human flourishing. Karl Marx, though often noted as a political philosopher, provides invaluable insight into elements of social philosophy relevant to our modern bioethical debate in his 1844 Manuscripts. In essence, Marx posits that in our daily lives we take decisions that have unintended consequences, which then combine to create large-scale social forces which may have an utterly unpredicted effect. He states that human are essential social beings, and therefore society is the essential “unity of man with nature.” The decisions we make as a society should take into account the nature of our social relations and the potential consequences. Marx’s greatest argument against the capitalist system is that it fundamentally builds constructions that are in conflict with our human, social essence. This is the argument that can be extended today to the realm of modern genetic science.

We can consider the four principle mechanisms of human alienation from the Marxian discussion and apply these mechanisms to the modern bioethical debate. The four principle mechanisms of human alienation discussed by Marx are:

Alienation from product

Alienation from the act of production

Alienation from the species-being

Alienation from other human beings

Marxian Alienation: A Modern Context

The First Mechanism of Alienation

Marx argued that to achieve true human flourishing, we as individuals must first overcome the different mechanisms of alienation in order to express our full humanity in relation both to nature and one another, and framed this argument within the subtext of alienated labour. Marx defines alienation as the estrangement of humans from aspects of human nature. This human nature consisted of the particular set of vital drives and tendencies than man expressed, and therefore alienation can be said to be a state in which these human drives and tendencies are stunted to some degree. As the worker produces more, he becomes more alien to the object of his labor, his product. This objectification of labor establishes what Marx calls “the loss of and subservience to the object. and the appropriation as alienation.” What does this mean in the greater scheme of things? Let is consider the example of a modern factory worker. The factory worker comes to work daily and begins his line of work, which is usually a specific task within the larger framework of the factory. Let us assume he works at an automobile factory. The product of his labor is the automobile, a product that this worker will most likely pass on through the system without considering it beyond the scope of his work. The factory worker does not associate with this product once it has passed, though the factory benefits from the production of this item. As a matter of fact, the factory will benefit more as the worker produces more product, while the worker thinks less and less of the actual product of his labor. The labor becomes a means of procuring some means of survival within the system and the worker is detached from the product of his work altogether. Despite the mechanistic character of this image, the factory worker motif is applicable to our modern consideration of genetic intervention. If considering this Marxian system of alienation described above, genetic intervention brings one more consumer product into this world, the human individual himself. Genetic intervention simply presents itself as potentially developing into another consumer choice, further establishing the mechanism of alienation from product, the product being the individual. In a world where human individuals could possibly be altered or modified in the hopes of establishing some sort of enhancement, the individual himself becomes the object or product of labour. In principle, man is alienated to this product and cannot use this product as a tool of self-expression. Therefore, the idea of genetically intervening in the “production” of human individuals not only objectifies the human person but also significantly distorts the individual as a mirror of himself. 

Yuppie Eugenics

This notion of being able to develop an enhanced human individual using genetics and biotechnology has been recently termed “Yuppie Eugenics.” Eugenics refers to the study of or belief in the possibility of improving the qualities of the human species or a human population, especially by such means as discouraging reproduction by persons having genetic defects or presumed to have inheritable undesirable traits (negative eugenics) or encouraging reproduction by persons presumed to have inheritable desirable traits (positive eugenics). Yuppie Eugenics is in a sense as genetic intervention focused primarily on genetic enhancement in order to produce progeny most advantageously suited for this world. Yuppie Eugenics goes beyond the call for intervening in addressing human ailment and disease by obliging the use of genetic enhancements to bring about more perfect persons. There is however a strong arm of critics who argue this idea of enhancing the genome through selective intervention is only dream that cannot be achieved. This opposing viewpoint can be seen in a 2002 article in Z Magazine titled “Yuppie Eugenics” by Harvard professor Ruth Hubbard and Stuart Newman from the New York Medical College. According to Hubbard and Newman, Yuppie Eugenics simply “builds on the mirage that applications of genetics and biotechnology will be able to make us more perfect.” The arguments held by yuppie eugenicists are similarly echoed by those who favor genetic intervention in the name of procreative beneficence. Julian Savulescu, the Uehiro Professor of Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford, is one of the premier proponents of the procreative beneficence argument for genetic intervention. Procreative beneficence argues that parents are morally obliged to do everything in their capacity to provide the best possible chance for their progeny, which includes intervening genetically if it would prove to most advantageous for the progeny. Savulescu argues that many “non-disease genes” can affect the likelihood of an individual leading the best possible life, therefore it is morally justifiable to use genetic intervention to enhance these non-disease genes and provide the best possible life. This enhancement is in addition to genetic intervention targeted at deleterious genes that an individual may possess. Savulescu goes on to say that individuals in all good reason should use information that may be available in reproductive decision making. 

Let is reconsider the Marxian mechanism of alienation of the product. If we define a product as the finished object of our labour, and through genetic intervention (labour) we reproduce an enhanced individual, we can justifiably categorize that individual as the product of genetic engineering. Marx points out that we as human beings are in principle detached from our product. This principle, when extended to human genetic engineering would imply that engineered progeny stand alienated from the paternal generation of individuals. A strict Marxist determination would consider genetic intervention a harm to the flourishing of a human individual. A more modern interpretation of more traditional Marxian principle can be seen through the social philosophies of German philosopher Jürgen Habermas. In his book The Future of Human Nature, Habermas first differentiates genetic intervention into therapeutically focused and enhancement focused. Therapeutic genetic intervention is justifiable under the premise of liberal morality, whereas genetic enhancements cannot be morally justifiable. According to Habermas, three major focus points indicate that genetic intervention, excluding that for therapeutic purposes, cannot be morally justifiable. First, the programmers, those exacting the intervention,  essentially impose their own personal preferences upon the individual they are “enhancing.” The alteration of the genetic identity of an individual basically knocks down any notion of equality between members of a society. Some members are given the right to alter the identity of others, making them superior to those being altered. One of the basic tenets of the Marxian liberal society is the presupposition that all individuals are equal. Secondly, the “subjective self-perception” of the programmed will be effected by knowing of ones existence as one programmed by another. Finally, the society that accepts the practice of genetic intervention as commonplace indicates the society relinquishes its grasp of morality and the liberal ideal therefore fails. In essence, the individual becomes alienated from the person he “creates” through genetic intervention. 

The Second Mechanism of Alienation

The second mechanism of Marxian alienation is that of the act of production, in this case, the act of reproduction. Why do we as human individuals reproduce? If we can create the perfect human baby through prenatal genetic modifications, what stops society from tailoring reproduction to satisfy the profit seeking goals of the system. The Marxian critique would be that genetic intervention allows the act of reproducing individuals becomes impersonal and benefit driven. Individuals would be tailored to produce the greatest amount and provide the greatest benefits to the society. Therefore the act of reproduction becomes a form of societal manufacturing. According to Marx, the markets direct our lives by dictating production as a function of profitability. Establishing genetic intervention as normalized practice would then allow the trends of society to determine what classification of individuals would be most profitable to that society. There are obvious problems with such a system, many of these echoing the first mechanism of alienation. The people who “manufacture” new individuals become desensitized to the object of their work, they see progeny as a product and reproduction itself becomes an impersonal means to that product. The society becomes debased from the structures of liberal morality and therefore falter from the liberal ideal. 

The Third Mechanism of Alienation

The third mechanism of Marxian alienation is that between man and the species being. The species being was a term that was coined by Karl Marx when he discussed what he believed to be the closest thing to “human nature.” Marx did not believe in the traditional theory of a human nature as an entity that incarnated itself within a physical human body. Instead, Marx proposed a theory of “human nature” that was representative of the sum of social relations. Since social relations could change and adjust with time and certain circumstances, Marx believed the species being is always determined in a specific social and historical formation, with some biological subtext. Once could consider the species being as a sort of aggregation of human natures within a particular society. With this in mind it easy to understand why Marx believed human were capable of making or shaping their own nature. An important question is whether we sacrifice the integrity of the species-being if we consider only genetic intervention in terms of individual reproductive liberties? In order to better answer this question it seems appropriate to discuss what Habermas terms the “species ethic.” Ethical issues dealt with “identity-forming beliefs that have to do with out self descriptions that guide our own identification as human beings...our self understanding as members of the species,” (pp 38-9) as opposed to moral issues that dealt with things that have to do with the just way of life and the just arrangement within society. Ethical questions therefore focused on considerations of who we are as human beings and how we define our lives and ourselves. In a society where all members maintain an “abstract morality of reason,” every individual establishes an ethical self-understanding which we call the species-ethic. Recalling what Marx himself discussed in terms of human nature: “the human essence of nature primarily exists only for social man.” Marx establishes that man is a social being, and the human essence that he possesses is only a function of his social character. He goes on state that “society is the completed, essential unity of man with nature,” and that “my own existence is  social activity; what I make from myself I make for society, conscious of my nature as social.” This idea that the human essence exists as a consequence of human social interaction is fundamental to applying Marxian social philosophy to out modern discussion. What science does today is by its very nature,  a social activity. What they discover and what they conclude is subject to the social constructions that they inhabit. Now reconsider the question of whether we sacrifice the integrity of the species-being if we consider genetic intervention only in terms of individual reproductive liberties? If we appeal to man’s human essence or human nature, we must appeal to a broader, social level because human essence can only exist on a broader social level. Therefore we are not satisfying the true scope of the species-being if we narrow our consideration to the individual reproductive liberties of an individual over that of the society at large. Reconsider previous points made about the affects on those who intervene and the effects on on those who are genetically altered; it seems that these consequences arise when considerations of the community of individuals are relegated behind the considerations of individual reproductive liberties. This holds especially true when considering the third consequence discussed earlier, the degradation of the liberal morality of the society as a result of normalizing something like genetic intervention practices. 

The Fourth Mechanism of Alienation

The fourth mechanism of Marxian alienation is that from other human beings. The alienation that results from the labour and production of material items essentially subordinates human interaction to the relationship between things. Human interaction become impersonal to the individuals involved. Therefore, this alienation converts the social relationships of men into relationships between property owners. The true conscious existence of man is social activity and social satisfaction, since man himself is a social being. By refusing the social aspect of man and the social needs of man’s daily existence, an impersonal chasm develops between individuals within a society. Is then the geneticization of the human individual simply reinforcing the alienation of man from man? Is not the reduction of men to genes in essence substantiating the inequalities present within society, especially in genetic intervention presents a clear choice for individuals to make. Richard C. Lewontin, a prominent American scientist who pioneered in modern genetic analysis and fathered the field of molecular evolution, also established himself in the field of social biology and evolutionary psychology. Lewontin has repeatedly voiced his concerns about the modern trend towards the oversimplification of genetics. How can we so easily reduce the most complex of human traits and characteristics to the scope of gene sequences in our DNA. In his book Biology as Ideology, Lewontin counters mainstream arguments for genetic determinism by explaining that much of the variation observed in nature is neither genetic nor environmental bur rather attributable to random variable growth, something he calls developmental noise. Attributing variation to developmental noise is not, he argues, the same as saying the differences were coded in genes. Another determinist idea is that of individual capacities. Certain proponents of genetic determinism argue that every organism is the coupled result of both environmental and genetic factors; however, natural variation is a sign that organisms may have varying capacities of development. Lewontin not only counters that there is no substantial biology to back this theory but also explains the dangerous potential of such ignorantly based ideologies about an individual. Genetic variations exist everywhere in nature and as often is the case, no single variation can be said to be absolutely superior to another. Certainly particular genetic variations display greater success in specific environments, but that cannot posit a clearly superior or inferior trait. Therefore organismal capacity is insufficient in accounting for variation. In Not in Our Genes, Lewontin along with fellow colleagues question much of the claimed heritability of human behavioral traits such as intelligence as measured by IQ tests. Lewontin even disregarded some of the lofty claims of the Human Genome Project under the premise that much that the HGP claimed simply assumed too much in the promise of the gene code. Lewontin analyzes the HGP in his book It Ain’t Necessarily So: The Dream of the Human Genome Project and Other Illusions, stating “There is no aspect of our lives, it seems, that is not within the the territory claimed by the power of DNA... greatly promised advances have yet to be realized from the sequencing of the human genome” (176). Chapter 5 of this book begins with Lewontin defining fetish: an inanimate object worshipped by savages on account of its supposed inherent magical powers, or as being animated by a spirit. Lewontin provide this definition in the chapter aptly titled “The Dream of the Human Genome” with the apparent implication of making the comparison of the HGP with a sort of scientific fetish. Lewontin makes some very good points in this analysis. Certainly, there have been cases through the development of the genetic field where individuals have taken genes beyond the scope of their potential, in the attempts to substantiate certain social agendas with apparent scientific backing. When we reexamine the fourth mechanism of alienation that Marx details, it is possible to consider serious social ramification of allowing genetic intervention to become a commonplace practice. An inevitable consequence would be the geneticization of inequality within social systems. It is fundamentally evident that as people begin developing preferential selectivity for genetic character traits, there must also be some implicit selection against certain traits. In an equitable liberal system this imbalance in individual standards is impermissible in order to maintain stability. In this case, genetic intervention not only reinforces the alienation between men but also seems to scientifically substantiate the claim that genetic variability may indicate superior and inferior genes. 

There is a strong modern trend towards providing individuals a choice when dealing with genetic intervention, or what some term procreative liberty. Proponent argue that the freedom to deal with cases of genetic intervention should be counted among the several other liberties that democratic constitutions entitle to individuals today. In his 2003 position paper in the American Journal of Law & Medicine titled “Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomic,” philosopher John A. Robertson makes a lengthy case on the side of an individuals right to choose how to deal with genetic intervention on a case by case basis. Robertson claims that in fact genetic intervention presents prospective parents with better methods of ensuring that their offspring will “live satisfying lives and be able to produce and care for offspring themselves,” and goes on further to say “legal prohibitions on genetic screening of the health of prospective offspring would appear to be an unjustified violation of an individual’s procreative liberty” (460). Robertson tends to affirm much of the claims expressed by proponents of procreative beneficence while delineating a difference between traditional eugenic practice and what he calls “private eugenics” where genetic screening techniques to ensure a healthy child does not show the “abusive features” of earlier eugenic practices. Finally, in accordance with his claim of procreative beneficence, Robertson indicates that in cases of genetic intervention, the parents have a moral obligation to ensure the best chance for their offspring. 

Conclusion

Marxian social philosophy is aged and storied yet it still presents solid principles that have strong modern applications. The theory of alienated labour can be used to describe the modern debates about the roles of genetic science in a very modern liberal society. The fundamental  idea that is conveyed today through the Marxist tradition as it pertains to this genomic era is a call for caution and moderation. Modern interpretations of this traditional message can be observed in the texts of Jürgen Habermas and even Richard Lewontin and the arguments are very clear. The social consequences of not showing restraint as the field of modern molecular genetics develops are important to assess and be aware of. Although proponents of genetic intervention argue on behalf of procreative beneficence and procreative liberties, the Marxist intellectual would advise to err on the side of caution and restraint.  

References

Habermas, Jurgen. The Future of Human Nature. Cambridge, UK: Polity P, 2004.

Lewontin, Richard C. Biology as Ideology. New York: Anansi P Limited, 1991. 16-37.

Lewontin, Richard C. It Ain't Necessarily So: the Dream of the Human Genome Project. New York: New York Review of Books, 2000. 135-186.

Lewontin, Richard C., Steven Rose, and Leon J. Kamin. Not in Our Genes. New York: 

Pantheon Books, 1984.

Marx, Karl, selections from “1844 Manuscripts” (Alienated Labor; Private Property and Communism) and from “The German Ideology,” in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, L. 

H. Simon (ed), (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1994).

Savalescu, Julian: 2001, “Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children,” 

Bioethics 15: 5.

Shannon, Thomas A., ed. "Genetics: Science, Ethics, & Public Policy." 

Readings in Bioethics. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Inc., 2005.

Rousseauian Considerations of the General Will and Majority Voting

The concept of the general will was first introduced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the eighteenth century. He ultimately attributed four basic characteristics to the general will, claiming it was inalienable, infallible, indivisible, and absolute. But what exactly was this general will and how are we to interpret it?

The question of defining the general will becomes more pronounced when Rousseau discusses this idea of majority voting in a civil society. Rousseau essentially presents two interpretations of what the general will consists of. In the first case, Rousseau identifies the general will with the preference of the majority. This comes from his claim that general would require some proposal if it consisted in the fact that the majority of people showed a preference for that proposal. In the second case, Rousseau identifies the general will with the common interest if the society. Rousseau claims that the general would require some proposal if it consisted on the fact that the proposal was in the common interest of the people. 

At first glance these interpretations seem to both be plausible explanations of the nature of the general will. However, further analysis of these interpretations under certain considerations pertaining to democratically determining the general will reveal certain inconsistencies. 

Rousseau first presents a consideration of the general will where the first interpretation that identifies the general will with the majority preference appears implausible. First we explore the first consideration. In a theoretical voting scheme, individuals would vote on a given proposal based on whether or not the proposal would be in agreement with what the individual deems the general will. In this scheme, the general will is determined by counting votes and in effect, would reflect the majority preference. Here, the genera will reflects the will of the majority, based on the individuals perceived will of the majority. What then do we make of a situation where the individual finds himself in the minority opinion? This would indicate the individual was incorrect about what he believed the was the will of the majority, or the general will. Therefore, the individual would accept the majority preference since that would be deemed the general will and abandon what he believed to be the general will. This scheme is implausible. 

In this first consideration, individual A votes on a proposal by considering what the he believes to be the general will requires. Individual B votes on the proposal using the same consideration, as does Individual C. In essence, individuals A, B, and C vote on the proposal by considering what the other will decide the general will requires. The majority of votes therefore reflects what the majority of individuals believed the majority preference would be. Therefore, the majority of individual preferences cannot be the general will itself. The general will cannot simply be a collection of individual preferences or the procedure of coming to a determination on the basis of individual preferences. The general will must be more this. 

Rousseau presents a solution to this conflict. According to Rousseau, in order to avoid this problem, all members who enter into the social contract should commit to obeying laws and regulations that are consistent with the common interest of all those in contract. The general will can therefore be identified with the common interest of all the people.  This avoids the problem of the previously proposed scheme because this would be more effective at determining what the general will actually required without the internal inconsistencies of voting based on the perceived voting of other. 

This also presents a problem. Rousseau claims earlier that the in the event that an individual found himself in the minority opinion, there would be a fundamental breach of personal liberties if it were necessary to completely abandon ones opinion simply because the majority voted in a different direction. This would indicate that the general will could not just identified with the common interest. Being in the minority opinion does not in and of itself deem an individual to be wrong, although it may give reason to reconsider ones original opinion. If the common interest was the only consideration, Rousseau explains that you would simply conclude you were incorrect about what the general will required if you found yourself in the minority opinion. 

When we look back at these two considerations, we see that the two interpretations of seem to situationally inconsistent. When we adopt the interpretation that identifies the general will with majority preference singularly, the interpretation proves implausible. When we adopt the interpretation that identifies the general will with the common interest singularly, this interpretation also proves to be seemingly implausible. What can we take from this result? Rousseau proposes a definition of the general will that does not take the two interpretations singularly but rather combines elements of both into a new, more comprehensive identification of the general will. 

The comprehensive definition of the general will therefore identifies the general will with both elements of majority preference and considerations of common interest. We therefore propose a definition of general will that identifies it as a procedure for making joint or collective decisions, based on considerations of the common interest. In addition, the general will regulates the actions of all the people bound in the social contract. This characterization of the general will establishes a systematic democratic society that takes on proceduralist, results-oriented, and preference-oriented elements. The individuals who enter into the social contract agree to be in accordance with the general will, and by extension agree to be in accordance with the determinations identified through this procedure. 

This proposed definition of the general will seems to settle the dilemma of the inconsistencies we observed in the two original interpretations. However, it would be prudent to also consider the nature of this voting that would be consistent with the proposed definition of the general will. Individuals must commit to obeying decisions made by the proposed voting procedure. However, what would constitute a vote that would require one to obey the decision that was reached? Rousseau makes the claim that unanimous decisions are instances where the decision of a vote should be obeyed. In the event that everyone agrees unanimously on a proposal, there would be no conflict and there would be no question as to what the general will is that should be obeyed. This is however often not the case. Often the members of a group will disagree on a proposed matter, and the common interest may not be clearly apparent. 

In cases where unanimity is not attained, Rousseau claims it would be fair to say the best possible mechanism for establishing a decision making procedure would be by considering majority voting. Majority voting itself could be further characterized based on the nature of the item being voted on. In general, Rousseau agrees that the majority rule can be established as either a simple majority, meaning fifty-percent plus one, or a more substantial majority number that would have to be deemed significant enough. The simple majority rule can apply to items of business that are more time sensitive than other situations, such as voting on items of serious law that would probably benefit from more careful consideration. Basically, once there is an agreement to obey the procedure of democratic voting and the decisions that result from the procedure, the definitions of majority rule can be determined based on the nature of the vote and the urgency of action deemed necessary. 

Thus, the claims Rousseau makes regarding majority voting are not consistent with any one of the interpretations discussed above if the interpretations are taken singularly. However, Rousseau settles this dilemma by proposing a third, more comprehensive interpretation of the general will that combines elements of both interpretations. The general will does identify with the majority preference, but cannot only be defined by majority preference. The general will does identify with the common interest of the people but the common interest alone would present an incomplete criteria for determining the general will. Rousseau’s general will is comprehensive and multi-oriented, consistent with the different interpretations.